Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (MT 2024)

For up-to-date information, see the invited speakers page.

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• Week 1 (17 October): Phillipp Brüllmann (Heidelberg University) ‘The look at nature: A Cynic tool and its Stoic use’ Chair: Simon Shogry
  

  • Abstract: Stoic philosophers have a strong inclination to look at nature in ethical contexts. Our sources on Stoic ethics abound with all kinds of references to what is, in some way or other, ‘natural’. This evidence, however, points in different directions, and so scholars disagree on how the look at nature contributes to the ethical project of the Stoics. In particular, there is a long-standing debate on whether nature is something like the ‘standard’ of Stoic ethics / whether Stoic ethics is somehow ‘grounded’ in nature. Much progress has recently been made on that question by Christopher Gill’s Learning to Live Naturally (2023). But even this wide-ranging monograph leaves, I think, some important aspects unexplained.

    The aim of my talk is hence to suggest a different approach to Stoic ethical naturalism. This approach starts, not from the Stoic evidence itself, but from the ancient tradition of using nature as an ethical standard. The look at nature was in the ethicist’s toolkit at least since Callicles made his appearance in Plato’s Gorgias. And the most consistent use of that tool was probably made by the Cynics, whose influence on Stoic ethics is well attested. So my idea is to consider the Cynic look at nature and discuss how Stoic arguments relate to that. This will help us explain some of the peculiarities of the Stoic evidence; or so I will argue.

    The talk falls into three parts. In the first part, I will consider the Cynic practice of imitating the behaviour of animals and children. I will show that in this practice nature is conceived as a standard of ethics in a straightforward way: you look at nature and you know what to do. I will discuss (i) how this straightforward way is linked to the revisionist agenda of the Cynics, (ii) by which implicit preassumptions it is guided, and (iii) how it is related to the Cynic refusal to do natural philosophy. In the second part, I will turn to the Stoic look at nature. At first glance, some features of the Stoic references to nature are quite similar to what we find in reports on Cynicism. So it makes sense to say, as I will argue, that the Stoics pick up a tool that is familiar from Cynic contexts. The Stoic use of that tool, however, seems to differ from the Cynic use in some respects. For one thing, the Stoic reference to nature is not meant to support a simple revisionism but a complex combination of revisionist and non-revisionist elements. For another, the Stoics do not combine the look at nature with a rejection of natural philosophy. On the contrary, a proper look at nature requires for them a deep understanding of the workings of the universe. After highlighting those differences, I will reflect, in the third part, on their implications. I will indicate what we can learn from them about the role of nature in Stoic ethics and how some of the puzzling features of the Stoic look at nature might be due to their using a Cynic tool for non-Cynic purposes.

• Week 5 (14 November): David Ebrey (University of Barcelona) ‘The initial division of the soul in Republic IV’. Chair: Cole Phelps
  • Abstract: This paper provides a new account of Socrates’ argument in Republic IV that the soul must have at least two parts (436a-439d). The central issue is how to understand the argumentative role of the so-called principle of non-opposition (436b). I argue against Bobonich, Lorenz, and Stalley’s interpretation, in favor of a more traditional framework. But this framework is sometimes used (e.g., by Irwin and Price) to support a deflationary account of what partition amounts to. I argue that the principle of opposition, when properly understood, really does license the conclusion that there is a single thing, the soul, that has significant structural complexity.
• Week 6 (21 November): Patricia Marechal (University of California San Diego) ‘Plato on Women, Thumos, and Agency’. Chair: Janine Gühler
  • Abstract: In this talk, I provide an interpretation of Plato’s repeated claims in Republic V that women are “weaker” than men. Specifically, I argue that Plato thinks women have a psychological propensity to get easily dispirited, which makes them less effective than men in implementing and executing their decisions. This interpretation achieves several things. It qualifies Plato’s otherwise progressive position regarding female guardians and their role in the polis. It expands our understanding of the nature and role of spirit (thumos) in Plato’s moral psychology. It provides the background against which we can interpret Aristotle’s claim in Politics I that women possess a deliberative capacity that is not authoritative (akuron). And, finally, it gives us insight into a kind of moral-psychological success and failure that Plato and Aristotle consider central to both personal and political agency.
• Week 7 (28 November): Zena Hitz (St John's College, Annapolis, Maryland) ‘Phronesis and politics’, Chair: Ursula Coope
  • Abstract: In Aristotle's practical philosophy, in what sense is practical wisdom (phronesis), the same thing as political understanding (politike)? He says "they are the same state, but their being is different' (VI.7, 1141b14). Scholars have understood him to mean that phronesis that governs the life of an individual is the basic or paradigm case -- or at least, the literature has proceeded apace under that assumption. I ask what would happen if we took political understanding-- in its central form as the art of legislation--as the central or paradigm case. I present evidence for this way of framing Aristotle's practical philosophy, and I sketch a picture of excellent political deliberation, using examples mostly from the Politics. I then offer a re-reading of the famous and controversial claim that phronesis does not deliberate about ends, and make suggestions as to how the re-framing may change how we see other persistent difficulties in Aristotle's ethical and political theory.
• Week 8 (5 December): David Bronstein, (University of Notre Dame, Australia) ‘Scientific Propositions in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6’, Chair: Andrea Buongiorno
  • Abstract: In this paper I propose a new interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of scientific a-propositions in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6. A scientific a-proposition is an affirmative universal proposition (of the form ‘A belongs to all B’) that can feature as a premise or conclusion of a scientific demonstration. The standard view is that, for Aristotle, in every scientific a-proposition (and indeed in every necessary affirmative proposition), there is a definitional connection between the proposition’s subject and predicate: either the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, or vice versa. I argue that this view leads to two significant problems in Aristotle’s account in Posterior Analytics 1.4–6, problems that threaten the coherence of his theory of science. I defend solutions to these problems by defending new interpretations of the relevant passages (1.6, 74b5–12 and 75a28–37). I argue that the standard view is mistaken: in these passages Aristotle is not committed to the claim that in every scientific a-proposition (or in every necessary affirmative proposition) there is a definitional connection between the proposition’s subject and predicate. Rather, on my interpretation, he is committed to a significantly less restricted theory of scientific a-propositions and, as a result, a significantly less restricted theory of science. Furthermore, I argue, this less restricted theory is consistent with his other commitments in Posterior Analytics1.4–6.