Summary of doctoral thesis: My doctoral thesis explores the relationship between ignorance and ethics in Stoic and Madhyamaka philosophy, arguing that according to both, ethical or virtuous action is the result not of theorising about right and wrong action, but of removing its primary obstacle: ignorance. Ignorance here is not simply the absence of knowledge, nor even the mere presence of false beliefs, but is rather an entirely flawed cognitive and psychological state. Both traditions hold that our actions are influenced by our beliefs about and perceptual encounter with the world; therefore, the primary aim of philosophy is to change our understanding of the world, specifically to replace ignorance with insight, so that we come to see the world as it really is, from which ethical or virtuous action follows. Stoic and Madhyamaka philosophy therefore resists the neat compartmentalisation of ethics so common in contemporary philosophy, as well as questioning many of its core assumptions. However, rather than either trying to conform Stoic and Madhyamaka philosophy to the constraints of our modern understanding of ethics or abandoning the term altogether, I suggest instead that these philosophies encourage us to expand and alter our notion of ethics altogether.