Mika Perälä (Helsinki) ‘Simultaneous perception in Aristotle’s De anima 3.2’
Abstract: In De Anima 3.2, 426b8–427a14, Aristotle examines the sense by which we discriminate between sensible features. The problem he addresses can be reconstructed as follows: (i) a sense can distinguish x from y only if it perceives both simultaneously; (ii) there are homogeneous sensible features, such as white and black, that a single sense cannot perceive simultaneously. Therefore, there are cases where a sense cannot distinguish x from y. According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle resolves this problem by rejecting the second premise, proposing instead that a common sense can perceive not only heterogeneous (e.g., white and sweet) but also homogeneous features simultaneously.
I contend that this interpretation is flawed for two reasons. First, it fails to resolve Aristotle’s problem: if the sense of sight cannot simultaneously perceive white and black, neither can the common sense. Second, it overlooks Aristotle’s conceptualisation of each sense as a discriminative capacity, both in this context and throughout the De anima. My interpretation suggests that Aristotle rejects the second premise by qualifying two underlying assumptions: that one and the same entity can possess contrary predicates in potentiality but not in actuality, and that perceiving is merely a form of being affected. Aristotle cannot uphold these assumptions, as they are overly simplistic in light of his conception of the senses as discriminative capacities.
Chair: Michael Peramatzis
