Summary of doctoral thesis: Aristotle subscribes to a philosophical position which has been traditionally referred to as the multivocity of being: roughly speaking, he holds that things are called 'beings', or said to 'be', in many ways. Throughout his Metaphysics, Aristotle puts forward several, not obviously equivalent formulations of this claim. The central task of my thesis is to establish how these should each be interpreted and understood to relate to one another. What I hope to show is that Aristotle’s various commitments to the multivocity of being ultimately make up a unified theory, which is underpinned by his commitment to the ontological primacy of substance. Against some recent lines of criticism, I also wish to argue that this theory is philosophically plausible: it is supported by various claims concerning essence and predication which are already at work in such earlier logical writings as the Topics and Posterior Analytics. In due course, I look forward to commenting on some of the main implications of my proposal: for example, on how Aristotle’s considered commitment to the multivocity of being bears on his plan for a single, universal science of being qua being, in Metaphysics Γ.
Other research interests: Ancient Greek logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of nature; History of logic and metaphysics; Contemporary analytic metaphysics; 'Indigenous epistemology'.