Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (HT 2025)
Lineup announced
For up-to-date information, see the invited speakers page.
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- Week 2 (30 January): Isabelle Chouinard (Yale) ‘Epictetus’ On Cynicism and the Stoic Debate on the Cynic Lifestyle’ Chair: Simon Shogry
- Abstract: Epictetus’ lecture On Cynicism (III 22) is both an enthusiastic praise of the Cynic sage and a disapproval of one of his student’s leanings toward Cynicism. This ambiguous attitude towards Cynicism stems from the complex relationship that the Stoics have with their Cynic heritage. The Stoics generally consider Diogenes to be a sage, but they do not want this example of virtue to translate into an unrestricted endorsement of the Cynic’s unconventional lifestyle. Thus, they establish specific conditions under which it is appropriate for philosophers to ‘Cynicize’ their way to virtue. In this talk, I will highlight the originality of Epictetus’ view by comparing it with earlier Stoic endorsements of Cynicism. Epictetus ingeniously co-opts Cynicism by using Stoic doctrines to defend the lifestyle of the Cynic sage and transforms true Cynicism into a kingly role that only the sage is allowed to perform.
- Week 4 (13 February): Mika Perälä (Helsinki) 'Epagōgē and archai in Aristotle’s ethics' Chair: Michael Peramatzis
- Abstract: Aristotle asserts that we acquire the archai or starting points for ethical inquiry through epagōgē (induction), perception, habituation, and other methods (EN I.7, 1098b3–4). However, his precise meaning and understanding of these terms remain open to interpretation. In this presentation, I seek to elucidate Aristotle’s view on the relationship between induction and starting points. Specifically, I examine how induction generates general concepts and universal claims from particular instances. One such claim is: ‘Excellence is the best state, condition, or capacity of all things that have a use or function’ (EE II.1, 1218b38–1219a1). How does Aristotle arrive at this claim through induction? I argue that addressing this question sheds light not only on his function argument within this context but also on the broader role of induction in providing premises for demonstrations. This analysis is crucial if, as many interpreters reasonably contend, Aristotle regards ethics, at least in part, as an explanatory science. However, there is reason to think that the role of induction is not limited to providing premises for demonstrations; I suggest that it can also be employed, as in the case of geometry (e.g., APo I.1, 71a17–29), to identify particulars as instances of a universal.
- Week 5 (20 January): Jenny Bryan (Manchester) 'Heraclitus’ Epistemic Pessimism’ Chair: Marion Durand
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Abstract: Heraclitus is often treated as an epistemic optimist, promising a route to understanding through the proper understanding of (his) logos. And yet there is very little in Heraclitus’ fragments which indicates or explains the route to that success. In fact, I argue, there is a strong case for understanding Heraclitus as presenting a much more limited promise of qualified epistemic achievement for humans.
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- Week 6 (27 February): Teddy Jennings (Oxford) ‘Visible Kinds and "True" Mathematics in Republic VI and VII’, Chair: Flora Nelson
- Abstract: There is a curiosity of Socrates’ analysis of the mathematical sciences in Republic VI and VII. His criticisms of the sciences seem to centre around necessary features: mathematicians treat hypotheses as first principles; they speak of ‘changing’ what they admit to be changeless entities; and they make use of ‘visible kinds’. Intuitively, Socrates is not here criticising mathematicians themselves for proceeding in this way, but rather commenting on the intellectual limitations of mathematics, given the kind of science that it is.
The idea is that for the mathematicians to stop doing any of what Socrates complains about would be to stop doing mathematics itself, and to take up dialectic. Yet it seems at least questionable whether mathematics evaporates at the removal of e.g. visible kinds. More, Socrates explicitly suggests that astronomy and harmonics can be upgraded, analogising them to geometry. I argue that the analogy between geometry on the one hand and astronomy/harmonics on the other implies that the use of ‘visible kinds’ is – at least in principle – dispensable. Further, I argue that Socrates envisions a version of mathematics which avoids his criticisms while still retaining its status as mathematics, and conclude by suggesting some consequences for the relationship of mathematics to dianoia, the second-best condition of the soul.
- Abstract: There is a curiosity of Socrates’ analysis of the mathematical sciences in Republic VI and VII. His criticisms of the sciences seem to centre around necessary features: mathematicians treat hypotheses as first principles; they speak of ‘changing’ what they admit to be changeless entities; and they make use of ‘visible kinds’. Intuitively, Socrates is not here criticising mathematicians themselves for proceeding in this way, but rather commenting on the intellectual limitations of mathematics, given the kind of science that it is.
- Week 8 (13 March): Allison Piñeros-Glasscock (Georgia State University) 'Others and Oikeiōsis: A Platonic source for the Stoic theory', Chair: Kassandra Dugi
- Abstract: The Stoic corpus offers two, competing accounts of the grounds of other-oriented ethical concern: one according to which concern for others is grounded in love of oneself and one according to which it is grounded in love of reason as such. I argue that the same, competing accounts are found in Plato’s Republic and that the Stoics inherited their accounts from Plato. I make my case, in part, by showing that the Stoics were already drawing on these passages to develop their theory of oikeiōsis. Their accounts of other-oriented ethical concern are, so to speak, byproducts of this more fundamental intellectual debt. A major implication of the paper is that Plato’s influence on the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis is stronger than has been recognized.
