Invited Speakers

Isabelle Chouinard (Yale) ‘Epictetus’ On Cynicism and the Stoic Debate on the Cynic Lifestyle’

Abstract: Epictetus’ lecture On Cynicism (III 22) is both an enthusiastic praise of the Cynic sage and a disapproval of one of his student’s leanings toward Cynicism. This ambiguous attitude towards Cynicism stems from the complex relationship that the Stoics have with their Cynic heritage. The Stoics generally consider Diogenes to be a sage, but they do not want this example of virtue to translate into an unrestricted endorsement of the Cynic’s unconventional lifestyle. Thus, they establish specific conditions under which it is appropriate for philosophers to ‘Cynicize’ their way to virtue. In this talk, I will highlight the originality of Epictetus’ view by comparing it with earlier Stoic endorsements of Cynicism. Epictetus ingeniously co-opts Cynicism by using Stoic doctrines to defend the lifestyle of the Cynic sage and transforms true Cynicism into a kingly role that only the sage is allowed to perform.

Chair: TBC

Mika Perälä (Helsinki) ‘Simultaneous perception in Aristotle’s De anima 3.2’

Abstract:

In De Anima 3.2, 426b8–427a14, Aristotle examines the sense by which we discriminate between sensible features. The problem he addresses can be reconstructed as follows: (i) a sense can distinguish x from y only if it perceives both simultaneously; (ii) there are homogeneous sensible features, such as white and black, that a single sense cannot perceive simultaneously. Therefore, there are cases where a sense cannot distinguish x from y. According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle resolves this problem by rejecting the second premise, proposing instead that a common sense can perceive not only heterogeneous (e.g., white and sweet) but also homogeneous features simultaneously.
I contend that this interpretation is flawed for two reasons. First, it fails to resolve Aristotle’s problem: if the sense of sight cannot simultaneously perceive white and black, neither can the common sense. Second, it overlooks Aristotle’s conceptualisation of each sense as a discriminative capacity, both in this context and throughout the De anima. My interpretation suggests that Aristotle rejects the second premise by qualifying two underlying assumptions: that one and the same entity can possess contrary predicates in potentiality but not in actuality, and that perceiving is merely a form of being affected. Aristotle cannot uphold these assumptions, as they are overly simplistic in light of his conception of the senses as discriminative capacities.

Chair: TBC

Francesca Masi (University Ca’ Foscari Venice) ‘The Physiology of the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias: Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus 49–51’

Abstract: Diogenes Laërtius states that in the Canon, Epicurus introduced as criteria of truth sensations, prolēpseis, and affections, and the later Epicureans added to these the epibolai phantastikai tēs dianoias (DL X.31). This seems to be confirmed in a passage from Philodemus’ On Signs, which includes epibolai phantastikai tēs dianoias among other criteria (fr. 1 De Lacy).
The notion of epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias rarely appears in Epicurus’ writings (KD 24; Ep. Hrd. 50–51). More frequently, Epicurus uses the term epibolē, possibly qualified according to the level of generality of its content (the distinction between partial (kata meros) and complete (athroa) epibolai, cf. Ep. Hrd. 35, 36, 69, 83), or the notion of epibolē associated with the genitives tēs dianoias and tōn kritēriōn (51), without reference to the adjective phantastikē. Although Epicurus also uses various expressions relating to epibolē in relevant passages of his work in which he discusses important methodological or physiological aspects of his doctrine, he never explains what it is. Interpreters have approached the subject of epibolē from a predominantly epistemological perspective, seeking precisely to establish:

1. what mental and cognitive act it is and what, if any, its content is;
2. in what relation it is to other cognitive states;
3. why the Epicureans felt the need to introduce the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias among the criteria of truth.

In the paper, the topic of the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias is approached from a physiological perspective. As with other mental states in the context of Epicurus’ atomistic psychology, it is possible to better understand its epistemic status only through understanding the physical nature of this state. For this analysis, I offer a re-reading of the Letter to Herodotus 49–51, in which the subject of epibolē is addressed in relation to the physiology of other cognitive states: perception, thought, and representation. Based on this examination, I propose to interpret the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias at the physiological level as the motion through which the mind assimilates and stabilises mental representation, i.e., the duplicate of the form of the external object, that in itself is materially fragile. For rappresentation is generated following the impact of a residual simulacrum of the external object, which at first during vision is recomposed in the eyes, provided that the eyes cannot receive an eidolon, namely the external surface of the object in its original dimension, but only small parts of it in a rapid and continuous way (Alex. Aphr. In Arist. De sensu 56.6-58.22; Mant. 134.28-136.28.), and then at a later moment, even in the absence of perception in act, flows thoughout the body into the heart in a thinned and shrunken form. I will also suggest that Epicurus’ physiology of epibole, so conceived, is strongly influenced by Aristotle’s explanation of the nature and origin of the phantasma.
Finally I will explain the relevance of this physiological interpretation of epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias on the epistemological level as well. In particular I will show that it makes possible to clearly distinguish epibolē from other processes at the basis of other mental states, such as perception, thought, memory and prolepsis; to explain why epibolē can occur without perception; to understand in what sense the Later Epicureans understood epibolē as an act of attention and how this should be intended in an atomistic psychological framework; to understand the summarising function it can have on the epistemological level; to clarify why it was elevated to the level of a criterion of truth.

Chair: TBC

Teddy Jennings (Oxford) ‘Visible Kinds and "True" Mathematics in Republic VI and VII’

Abstract: There is a curiosity of Socrates’ analysis of the mathematical sciences in Republic VI and VII. His criticisms of the sciences seem to centre around necessary features: mathematicians treat hypotheses as first principles; they speak of ‘changing’ what they admit to be changeless entities; and they make use of ‘visible kinds’. Intuitively, Socrates is not here criticising mathematicians themselves for proceeding in this way, but rather commenting on the intellectual limitations of mathematics, given the kind of science that it is.
The idea is that for the mathematicians to stop doing any of what Socrates complains about would be to stop doing mathematics itself, and to take up dialectic. Yet it seems at least questionable whether mathematics evaporates at the removal of e.g. visible kinds. More, Socrates explicitly suggests that astronomy and harmonics can be upgraded, analogising them to geometry. I argue that the analogy between geometry on the one hand and astronomy/harmonics on the other implies that the use of ‘visible kinds’ is – at least in principle – dispensable. Further, I argue that Socrates envisions a version of mathematics which avoids his criticisms while still retaining its status as mathematics, and conclude by suggesting some consequences for the relationship of mathematics to dianoia, the second-best condition of the soul.

Chair: TBC

Allison Piñeros-Glasscock (Georgia State University) 'Others and Oikeiōsis: A Platonic source for the Stoic theory'

Abstract: The Stoic corpus offers two, competing accounts of the grounds of other-oriented ethical concern: one according to which concern for others is grounded in love of oneself and one according to which it is grounded in love of reason as such. I argue that the same, competing accounts are found in Plato’s Republic and that the Stoics inherited their accounts from Plato. I make my case, in part, by showing that the Stoics were already drawing on these passages to develop their theory of oikeiōsis. Their accounts of other-oriented ethical concern are, so to speak, byproducts of this more fundamental intellectual debt. A major implication of the paper is that Plato’s influence on the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis is stronger than has been recognized.

Chair: TBC