Summary of doctoral thesis: In Metaphysics Ε.2 Aristotle argues that ‘regarding the accidental, … there is no scientific treatment of it’ and ‘no science– practical, productive, or theoretical- troubles itself about it’. Accidental things, in Aristotle’s view, are rare occurrences, i.e., things that come to be neither always nor for the most part. Therefore, Aristotle’s claim would be that science does not study exceptions and abnormalities. However, this view seems to conflict with some of Aristotle’s other doctrines, in particular with the discussion of coming-to-be of monsters in GA IV.3 and his theory of spontaneous generation in Metaphysics Ζ.9 and GA III.11. The reason why there is an apparent conflict is that on one hand, as I argue, monsters and spontaneously generated animals are accidental and according to Aristotle’s view in Ε.2 there is no scientific treatment of them and on the other hand Aristotle provides an apparently scientific account of how they come to be in his other works. The main aim of my thesis is to explore and assess the reason(s) why Aristotle holds that no science studies the accidental and whether such view is compatible with the two doctrines just mentioned.
Other research interests: Ancient Greek natural philosophy and metaphysics; Islamic philosophy (especially Avicenna's natural philosophy and metaphysics)
