Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (MT 2025)

For up-to-date information, see the invited speakers page.

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• Week 2 (23 October): Chris Izgin (Oxford): 'Themistius on the Grasp of Axioms in the Posterior Analytics' Chair: Ursula Coope
  • Abstract: In his Paraphrasis of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Themistius claims that the intellect grasps the per se attributes of which axioms are composed. However, he does not give any examples, leaving his account unsubstantiated. I aim to show that Aristotle’s principles of non-contradiction and of excluded middle, which are axioms common to all demonstrative sciences, are derivable from the per se attributes that are part of Aristotle’s definition of contradiction.
• Week 3 (30 October): Rachel Barney (Toronto): 'Plato on the Normativity of Craft' Chair: Simon Shogry [Ackrill Lecture. 4pm; Amersi Lecture Theatre, Brasenose College]
• Week 4 (6 November): Kassandra Dugi (Oxford): 'TBC' Chair: Alex Bown
  

  • Abstract: TBC

• Week 5 (13 November): Malcolm Keating (Smith College): 'Selves and Sky-flowers: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Metaphor and Nonexistents' Chair: Monima Chadha
  • Abstract: The seventh-century philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in explaining his theory of metaphor, also discusses the problem of negative existentials and nonreferring terms, for cases used by his Buddhist opponents, such as “There is no self” and “The self is a sky-flower.” I show how Kumārila’s broadly descriptivist solution to these puzzles acts as a defense of his preferred theory of metaphor. This case also illustrates the importance of taking Mīmāṃsā texts like the Tantravārttika seriously as philosophical works, even if, given their concern with Vedic hermeneutics, they are less often the topic of modern philosophical interest.
• Week 6 (20 November): Kelli Rudolph (Kent) : 'TBC' Chair: Marion Durand
  • Abstract: TBC
• Week 7 (27 November): Francesca Masi (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia): 'The Physiology of the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias: Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus 49–51' Chair: Michail Peramatzis
  • Abstract: Diogenes Laërtius states that in the Canon, Epicurus introduced as criteria of truth sensations, prolēpseis, and affections, and the later Epicureans added to these the epibolai phantastikai tēs dianoias (DL X.31). This seems to be confirmed in a passage from Philodemus’ On Signs, which includes epibolai phantastikai tēs dianoias among other criteria (fr. 1 De Lacy).
    The notion of epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias rarely appears in Epicurus’ writings (KD 24; Ep. Hrd. 50–51). More frequently, Epicurus uses the term epibolē, possibly qualified according to the level of generality of its content (the distinction between partial (kata meros) and complete (athroa) epibolai, cf. Ep. Hrd. 35, 36, 69, 83), or the notion of epibolē associated with the genitives tēs dianoias and tōn kritēriōn (51), without reference to the adjective phantastikē. Although Epicurus also uses various expressions relating to epibolē in relevant passages of his work in which he discusses important methodological or physiological aspects of his doctrine, he never explains what it is. Interpreters have approached the subject of epibolē from a predominantly epistemological perspective, seeking precisely to establish:
    1. what mental and cognitive act it is and what, if any, its content is;
    2. in what relation it is to other cognitive states;
    3. why the Epicureans felt the need to introduce the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias among the criteria of truth
  • In the paper, the topic of the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias is approached from a physiological perspective. As with other mental states in the context of Epicurus’ atomistic psychology, it is possible to better understand its epistemic status only through understanding the physical nature of this state. For this analysis, I offer a re-reading of the Letter to Herodotus 49–51, in which the subject of epibolē is addressed in relation to the physiology of other cognitive states: perception, thought, and representation. Based on this examination, I propose to interpret the epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias at the physiological level as the motion through which the mind assimilates and stabilizes mental representation, i.e., the duplicate of the form of the external object, that in itself is materially fragile. For rappresentation is generated following the impact of a residual simulacrum of the external object, which at first during vision is re-composed in the eyes, provided that the eyes cannot receive an eidolon, namely the external surface of the object in its original dimension, but only small parts of it in a rapid and continuous way (Alex. Aphr. In Arist. De sensu 56.6-58.22; Mant. 134.28-136.28.), and then at a later moment, even in the absence of perception in act, flows thoughout the body into the heart in a thinned and shrunken form.  I will also suggest that Epicurus’ physiology of epibole, so conceived, is strongly influenced by Aristotle’s explanation of the nature and origine of the phantasma.
    Finally I will explain the relevance of this physiological interpretation of epibolē phantastikē tēs dianoias on the epistemological level as well. In particular I will show that it makes possible to clearly distinguish epibolē from other processes at the basis of other mental states, such as perception, thought, memory and prolepsis ; to explain why epibolē can occur without perception; to understand in what sense the Later Epicureans understood epibolē as an act of attention and how this should be intended in an atomistic psychological framework; to understand the summarising function it can have on the epistemological level; to clarify why it was elevated to the level of a criterion of truth. 
• Week 8 (4 December): Alesia Preite (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg): 'TBC' Chair: Simon Shogry
  • Abstract: TBC