Topics in Indian philosophy of perception and aesthetics – Graduate Seminar (TT 2024)

Mondays, 11am–1pm, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Convened by Monima Chadha

This set of lectures concerns topics in Indian philosophy that complement the 2024 John Locke lectures. These Locke lectures, titled "Seeing in Sanskrit," will be about Nyāya philosophy of perception. In Nyāya epistemology, perception is thought of as the primary source of knowledge. To orient the discussion of perception, we begin, in Week 1, thinking about the concept of knowledge and that of a knowledge source in the Nyāya tradition. We then turn our attention to the Nyāya philosophy of perception.

Nyāya philosophers defend a version of direct or naïve realism. This view has many defenders but, unsurprisingly, also detractors in contemporary philosophy. We explicate the specific version of naïve realism developed by Matilal (2002c) by paying attention to the respective arguments offered by them. Like all naïve realists, the Naiyāyikas must face up to the argument from illusion. But there are other problems too that arise for the Nyāya brand of naïve realism because of their peculiar epistemic commitments: they believe that the self, universals, and even absences, can be perceived. We discuss whether perception of such unorthodox entities is consistent with naïve realism. Lastly, we look to test the philosophical case for naïve realism by asking whether we can generalise the theory beyond seeing.

A good general introduction to classical Indian discussions of some of these questions is Bimal Krishna Matilal's 1986 book, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (OUP).

Primary text:
Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

Provisional Schedule and Readings:

W1. Nyāya on Knowledge and Sources of Knowledge
Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 1, pp. 11-19

Recommended Reading

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002a. On the Concept of Philosophy in India. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 358-369.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002b. Knowledge Truth and Pramatva. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-161
Ganeri, Jonardon 2018 Epistemology from a Sanskritic point of view, in Epistemology for the Rest of the World, edited by Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich and Eric McCready Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12–21.

W2. Nyāya on Perception
Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 1, pp. 20-27

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7, pp. 223-255
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8, pp. 255-292
Phillips, Stephen 2012. Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School, London: Routledge, Chapter 3, pp. 41-58.

W3. A Nyāya Defence of Naïve realism
Essential Reading

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002c. Naïve realism, Nyāya realism, and the causal theory. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–113.

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002d. A realist view of perception. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 182–200.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002e. On the notion of the locative in Sanskrit. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 326–332.
Martin, M.G.F., 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in A. O’Hear (ed.) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, 157–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

W4. Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Hallucinations and Illusions

Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 3, pp. 65-72

Recommended Readings

Dravid, N. S. (1996). The Nyāya-Vaisesika explanation of illusion. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 24(1), 37–48.
Vaidya, Anand Jayprakasha. 2013. Nyāya perceptual theory: disjunctivism or anti-individualism? Philosophy East & West 63 (4): 562–85.
Phillips, Ian. 2016. Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions, Philosophical Topics 44(2), special issue on Perceptual Appearances, (eds) C. Hill & B. McLaughlin.

W5. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Absences

Essential Reading

Bhattacharyya, K. C. 1930. The Subject as Freedom. Chapter 4, Knowledge of Absence as a Present Fact, pp. 106-123

Recommended Readings

Beaulieu Jack Gaṅgeśa on Absence in Retrospect (2021). Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49(4): 603–639.
Vaidya, Anand, Bilimoria, Purushottama and Shaw, Jaysankar (2016) Absence: An Indo- Analytic Inquiry, with Sophia Journal of International Philosophy and Traditions Vol. 55.4: 491-513.
Farennikova, Anna. 2013. Seeing absence. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.

W6. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Universals
Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 7 pp. 138-155.

Recommended Readings

Taber, J. (2015) A Road Not Taken in Indian Epistemology: Kumārila’s Defense of the Perceptibility of Universals,” in Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics, ed. Joerg Tuske, Bloomsbury Publishing.
Chadha, M. (2014). On Knowing Universals: the Nyāya Way. Philosophy East and West, 64(2), 287–302.
Armstrong, David M., 1986, “In Defence of Structural Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1): 85–88.

W7. Possible Objections to Nyāya Naïve realism: Self
Essential Reading

Dasti, Matthew and Phillips, Stephen trans. and eds. 2017. The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Chapter 6, pp. 74-94

Recommended Readings

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002e. The Perception of Self. Mind, Language and World, vol. ii of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 299–314.
Taber John (2012) “Uddyotakara’s Defense of a Self,” in Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue, ed. Irina Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 97-114.
Chakrabarti, A. 1992. I Touch What I Saw, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52/1: 103–16.

W8. Generalising Naïve realism: Beyond Seeing

Essential Reading

Phillips I. ‘Hearing and hallucinating silence’, in F.Macpherson & D. Platchias (eds) Hallucination, MIT Press, 2013, pp. 333-360

Recommended Readings

Martin, M.G.F., 1992, “Sight and Touch”, in Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196–215.
Nanay, B. (2022) Amodal completion and relationalism. Philosophical Studies 179, 2537–2551
O'Callaghan, Casey. 2017. Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions. In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia. Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 45-58.