Mondays, 11am-1pm; Schwarzman Centre (Ryle Room)
Convened by Prof Karen Margrethe Nielsen
This seminar will consider Aristotle’s discussion of voluntary action, deliberation and decision in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) and Eudemian Ethics (EE). Why are human beings ‘principles of action’, and what does Aristotle mean when he defines virtue as a ‘hexis prohairetikê’, or a decision-making state? We will consider the role that the notion of prohairesis (decision) plays in Aristotle’s ethics and theory of action. Aristotle maintains that everything that we decide to do is voluntary, but not everything that is voluntary is caused by decision. What is voluntary action, according to Aristotle, and how do actions we decide to do differ from actions that are voluntary, but not caused by a decision? Does Aristotle offer a persuasive account of force (bia) and compulsion (anankê)? Can an act be compelled but nevertheless voluntary? Can an act be compelled but nevertheless caused by a deliberate decision? Are there noteworthy differences between the treatments of these topics in the EN and EE, and if so, what explains the differences?
The seminar is restricted to students in the MSt programme in Ancient Philosophy. DPhil students in the Faculty of Philosophy working on topics related to the seminar and BPhil students on the Ancient Philosophy track may request permission to attend.
