Summary of doctoral thesis: In his discussion about time, Aristotle gives two criteria to distinguish things in time from things not in time (Phys. IV, 12): something is in time if it has a finite duration (1), and if the thing’s being is changing or at rest (2). Consequently, things that change but that do not have a finite duration are not in time (e.g., the heavens and the souls). These things are not in time just because they are finite. But finite duration does not seem an essential feature of things in time. This gives rise to the following question: what is the essential feature that allows to distinguish things in time from things not in time? What is the real significance of being in time? Simplicius, one of the most important Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, discusses this question dealing with the relationship between being in time, being affected by time, being changeable or unchangeable, and being everlasting. The goal of my research is, firstly, the assessment of Simplicius’ solutions to Aristotle’s difficulties about being in time, and, secondly, to show how, in turn, this can affect or even contribute to the metaphysical understanding of the nature of time.
Other research interests: Mediaeval Metaphysics; Aesthetics.