Seminar on Indian Philosophy (HT 2025)

Convened by Dr Jessica Frazier

This series of regular seminars brings together scholars and students working on Indic philosophies and religions. It focuses on topics of current research: in each session, two people will present a context they are investigating for 20min, and then open it for discussion on key questions. All researchers, graduates and finalists in all areas are welcome to join.

All events are in the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies (OCHS) Library, 15 Magdalen Street, OX1 3AE.

 

Week 6 (Wednesday, 26 February) 2.30pm-4.00pm

Riccardo Paccagnella: Do Debates Have Prerequisites?
This talk will explore Śrīharṣa's first refutation in his Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, a seminal work in Indian philosophy that in a very Nāgārjuna-like fashion rejects in toto not only the definitions of the most central philosophical concepts of the time (12th c.), such as pramā or pramāṇa, but also the very possibility of defining such concepts. This refutation aims to discredit the widely spread idea that debaters need to have already accepted the means of valid knowledge to undertake a debate.

 

Anthony Ruda: Another Look at Alokākāśa
This talk examines the "non-world space" of Jaina ontology in the context of gaṇitānuyoga (mathematical discipline as a vehicle toward liberation). Identifying Pythagorean, Platonic and Advaitic analogues, in the spirit of anekāntavāda (many-sidedness), this talk aims to show how various conceptions of reality may mutually illuminate each other.

Week 7 (Wednesday, 5 March) 2.30pm-4.00pm

Dr Jack Beaulieu: Udayana on Familiar Epistemic Situations

The notion of familiar epistemic situations (abhyāsadaśā) serves an important set of theoretical roles in Nyāya. Authors such as Vācaspati appeal to the notion of familiarity to solve a regress problem that traces back to Nāgārjuna, while authors like Udayana and Gaṅgeśa understand unfamiliar epistemic situations (anabhyāsadaśā) to constitute cases in which, intuitively, one is not in a position to learn that one learned. This talk explores Udayana's remarks on this distinction in his Pariśuddhi, one of the few systematic Nyāya accounts available.

 

Jacob Parkinson: Relishing In-Itself and For-Itself: A Problem of Interpretation in Abhinavagupta

In his monumental Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta adopts, from Bhaṭṭa‐Nāyaka, a crucial distinction between two modes of relishing (āsvāda): the relishing of aestheticized emotions (rasāsvāda) and the relishing of the Absolute (brahmāsvāda). Rasāsvāda denotes a transfigured emotional experience elicited through poetry, theatre, and the arts—a form of enjoyment mediated by the objects of an artistic presentation. In contrast, brahmāsvāda refers to an unmediated, immediate relishing of brahman, the ultimate ground of being. The distinction continues to pose interpretive challenges regarding the relationship between Abhinavagupta’s aesthetics and his Tantric philosophy; exploring how these two forms of relishing converge and diverge, this presentation highlights broader implications for Abhinavagupta's work as a whole.