The Philiminality Oxford Work-in-progress Seminar for Cross-cultural Philosophy (POWSCP) seeks to offer graduate students working on liminal philosophies an opportunity to present their current work to Oxford‘s interdisciplinary graduate community. This bi-termly seminar aims to be a place for the fruitful exchange of philosophical ideas across diverse traditions, speakers are therefore not only invited to receive feedback from an assigned graduate commentator and the audience but also encouraged to participate in a short roundtable discussion with the other speakers and commentators after the talks.
Session 1: Free Will and Agency
Prerita Govil (University of Oxford) 'Am I an Agent: The Nature of Action According to Pāṇini and the Naiyayikas'
Abstract: What can one learn from Sanskrit about the nature of free will and selfhood? The choice to emphasize the kartṛ (agent) and karman (patient) of a sentence in addition to the prominence of agent nouns and causatives reveal where our focus must be: kriyā (action). Yet, several questions arise: what is an agent; is the self an agent?; does inaction signify a lack of agency? This discussion will explore the tension between the Pāṇinian argument that agency is not merely limited to “sentient and intelligent” beings and the Nyāya insistence that agency requires not only these core qualities but also the ability to “make a conscious effort” (see Nash and Cardona, 2013). In doing so, I will also reflect upon Arjuna’s inaction in the Bhagavadgītā, asking what this inquiry means for ourselves as free agents.
Kassandra Dugi (University of Oxford): 'Do Mādhyamikas Believe in Free Will? Śāntideva on Intention, Agency and Causation'
Abstract: My talk will focus on Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.22-32 and argue that rather than providing a potential Madhyamaka response to the question of whether we have free will, as is commonly assumed, these verses much more radically seek to challenge our notions about the nature and causes of action altogether, thus rendering any discussion about the existence of free will fundamentally untenable.
